The Weaponization of INTERPOL
- Morgan McBride
- Jul 31, 2025
- 6 min read
Updated: Dec 15, 2025
How does INTERPOL's Red Notice system get exploited for nefarious purposes? How can INTERPOL better insulates its system, while maintaining its effectiveness?

What is INTERPOL?
INTERPOL, the International Criminal Police Organization, is an intergovernmental organization with 196 member countries. INTERPOL is responsible for providing a secure and easily accessible venue for its member countries to share and access data on crimes and criminals operating in the international market.
The organization ultimately aims to provide a cooperative network of policing and law enforcement to support its member countries, which has grown increasingly essential as crime has become more global in scope.
The organization coordinates networks of police and experts with varying crime-related expertise, mainly by offering investigative support such as forensic analysis and fugitive locating tools.
INTERPOL facilitates international cooperation against crime, but it is not a police force.
Coordinating with nations, regardless of existing diplomatic relations, is productive through INTERPOL’s system to combat the burgeoning, intricate array of criminal activities that span the globe.
The organization’s actions, in principle, remain neutral; however, some gaps in its institutional framework have weakened INTERPOL’s ability to act as a neutral international organization.
Weaponization of Red Notices
Every member country of INTERPOL has the power to submit a variety of “colored” notices to the wider INTERPOL community, signalling requests for help locate missing people (yellow), collect information on illicit activities (blue), warn other countries about bombs and weapons circulating abroad (orange), request information needed to identify a body (black), alert other nations about potential criminals on the move (green), and to call for the arrest and extradition of specific people (red).
Although INTERPOL’s Red Notice system has been active since 1946, a recent increase in the number of red notices requested by member countries from 1,200 in 2000 to 12,000 in 2020 poses some concern.
Member governments, particularly those of authoritarian regimes, have used INTERPOL’s systems to pursue dissidents, political exiles, critics, and refugees living outside of their country.
For instance, Tajikistan, a country in Central Asia comprising approximately 0.12% of the global population, has issued 2,528 red notices, which amounts to 2.3% of those in circulation as of 2019. The stark overuse of Red Notices in a single country clearly highlights the weaponization of these tools.
Such a weaponization of its function threatens the trust and effectiveness of INTERPOL.
Attempting to or effectively manipulating INTERPOL’s resources in this way is a harmful feature of transnational repression, in which countries extend their reach overseas to silence or target adversaries.
Turkey’s Abuse of INTERPOL
As a member country of INTERPOL since the organization’s founding in 1923, Turkey has maintained its membership for over a century. Yet, after a coup attempt in July 2016, the Turkish government has been weaponizing INTERPOL’s systems to carry out a remarkable campaign of transnational repression against its critics abroad.
Throughout the early years of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s reign, he used the Gülen movement’s bureaucratic expertise to run the country, and subsequently exploited their connections to remove the military from politics.
With the Turkish military pushed aside, the Justice and Development Party (also known as the AKP), which is led by Erdoğan, and the Gülenists vied for control of the Turkish state. Since 2013, the Turkish government has accused Gülenists of establishing a “parallel state” that has followed its own agenda by infiltrating the police, judiciary, military, and other state institutions.
The ensuing power grab in Turkey unraveled as, amongst other tactics, President Erdoğan sought to force individuals believed to be Gülenists out of the security services and government ministries. However, shortly after, the Turkish police carried out dawn raids against leading businessmen and allies of Erdoğan. Erdoğan and many others became convinced that Gülenists orchestrated these raids.
So, in May of 2016, the Turkish government officially declared the Gülen movement as a terrorist organization -- yet to this day, no democratic country recognizes the Gülen movement as a terrorist organization.
On the evening of July 15th, 2016, a faction of the Turkish military launched a coordinated attempt to topple Erdoğan’s government. Military tanks flooded the streets of Istanbul. Soldiers invaded the AK Party’s headquarters. And fighter jets bombed the parliament building in Ankara. This coup attempt led to the death of 251 people and the injury of another 2,000.
During the two-year state of emergency period after the coup attempt, tens of thousands of people were arrested pending trial, and at least 125,000 civil servants, military personnel, and academics were either sacked or suspended from their positions due to suspected links to the Gülen movement.
According to the Red Notice Monitor, what Turkey characterizes as counterterrorism is, in reality, a campaign to silence critics and perceived opponents, particularly those affiliated, real or alleged, with the Gülen movement.
On October 19, 2017, Turkey’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, said, “We will never leave alone those who fled abroad; we will chase them until they are punished as they deserve. Those who betrayed Turkey and the Turkish nation will not be comfortable for the rest of their lives, whether in Turkey or abroad.”
According to official statements by its interior ministry, Turkey has sent 800 extradition requests to 105 countries between 2018 and 2021, and more than 110 alleged members of the Gülen movement have been brought back to Turkey as part of the government’s global campaign.
As part of its widespread campaign, the Turkish government also manipulates INTERPOL’s Stolen and Lost Travel Documents Database (SLTD) by filing tens of thousands of cases against critics and opponents who, in many instances, are not even aware that their passports have now been invalidated.
Out of concern for the integrity and credibility of the system, the INTERPOL Secretariat eventually suspended the Turkish police's access privileges to file cases through the organization’s mechanisms for a period.
Yet, this has not deterred Turkey from attempting to manipulate the INTERPOL system. As the Nordic Monitor reported on July 17, 2025, a classified memo issued by Turkey’s Security General Directorate (Emniyet) unveils covert efforts to circumvent INTERPOL rules in order to secure a Red Notice against a Turkish journalist living in exile who had been granted asylum in Sweden.
For nearly a decade now, Turkey has been weaponizing INTERPOL’s notice system to silence and suppress political criticism and opposition, but they are far from the only nation doing so.
Strengthening INTERPOL’s Notice System
Although performing the balancing act of catching criminals while mitigating abuses of the system is complex, it is necessary for the longevity of INTERPOL.
Within the current framework, authoritarian regimes do not even need to prosecute their red notice subjects successfully. The mere submission of the notice itself causes the intended damage to the dissident or exiled individuals.
So, the reform of red notices needs to be initiated at the beginning of the process, since the potential harm arises early in red notice implementation.
A clear step forward involves increasing the efficiency of INTERPOL’s oversight protocols so that innocent people do not unnecessarily spend weeks or months in jail waiting for their notices to be overturned.
Additionally, rebuilding the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF) to enhance due process in the red notice system would allow operations to continue as is, with added protective measures against improper uses of the system.
Reform of INTERPOL’s internal structures and due diligence mechanisms would be a clear step towards improving the organization’s ability to combat transnational crime.
The International Criminal Police Organization’s continuous efforts to prevent and combat crime through enhanced cooperation and innovation in law enforcement remain an indispensable part of the world’s fight against transnational crime. So, INTERPOL’s ability to reform its internal structures and due diligence mechanisms would be a clear step towards fulfilling its intended mission.
And it is a mission that will remain critical for the safety and security of all people in all 197 countries.
Sources:
https://www.fairtrials.org/articles/case-studies/vicdan-ozerdem/
https://yeniposta.de/bir-egilmez-bukulmez-kadin-yazar-vicdan-ozerdem/
https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Legal-framework/Membership-of-INTERPOL
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/15/turkeys-failed-coup-attempt-explainer
INTERPOL. Rep. INTERPOL Annual Report 2022. Lyon, France: INTERPOL, 2022.
INTERPOL. Rep. 2022 INTERPOL Global Crime Trend Summary Report. Lyon, France: INTERPOL, 2022
Jackson, R. L. “Interpol.” The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles 34, no. 1 (1961): 7–12. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032258x6103400102
Lemon, Edward. “Weaponizing Interpol.” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 2 (2019): 15–29. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0019.
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/interpol-vulnerable-political-abuse

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